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Abstract 
The actions of collectives who primarily meet on-line have recently captured the 
attention of the media, general public, business executives, and academics. File-sharing, 
open-source, and computer viruses are all carried out by loosely bounded collectives, rather 
than by firms or other formal organizations. These collectives operate in concert to 
accomplish innovation goals that may have great economic significance. Despite their 
importance, empirical work is scarce, and theoretical work has taken either the self-interest 
or the communal view to explain contributions. We point out the logical deficiencies and 
continue empirically through original data on a collective devoted to the sharing of digital 
music, which does not fit neatly in either explanation. To account for the survival and 
effectiveness of these collectives, we offer a four legged framework that draws on research in 
economic sociology and behavioral economics. We argue that the survival of cooperation 
despite known free riding has to do with the nature of the exchanged good – economic 
goods that are non-rival are more likely to be exchanged in an open system, and the (non) 
identifiability of (defectors) beneficiaries encourages cooperative behavior and discourages 
costly punishments. Further, we argue that the efficiency in production is achieved through 
the mode of exchange – generalized exchange is more conducive to innovative work than 
direct exchange, and by institutional mechanisms allow these collectives to enjoy some of the 
benefits of formal organizations, while preserving their unique advantages. The suggested 
framework fits more phenomenon than previous explanations and can easily produce 
refutable propositions. 
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 The actions of collectives who primarily meet on-line have recently captured the 
attention of the media, general public, business executives, and academics. Music sharing, 
where millions of users allow others to download digitized music from their computer, has 
become a major concern for music publishers, allegedly leading to substantial revenue lost, 
as argued in the court case of Napster (2001), the bête noir of file sharing applications. In a 
recent survey by Pew Internet & American Life Project, 29% of internet users have indicated 
participation in file sharing, a number estimated at 35 million people in the United States 
alone (Madden and Lenhart 2003). Impressive as it is, the figure is likely an underestimate 
due to legal threats to participants in such collectives over copyright violation.  
Separately, well coordinated electronic attacks have caused wide-ranging disruptions, 
infested servers and computers with viruses and wrecked havoc on e-mail communication 
(Guth and Machalaba 2003; Thompson 2004). More benignly, open source software has 
become a viable alternative to commercial software. What has once been the domain of 
computer hobbyists (or “hackers”), has gained acceptance with major corporations and 
governments (Guth 2003) and created hundreds of millions of dollars in value (Lohr 2003). 
Several accounts of open source software production show that developers contribute to the 
production of software through collective action organized on-line and in absence of direct 
monetary compensation (Kogut and Metiu 2001; O'mahony 2002; Raymond 1999). Not only 
the software is shared among contributors, but it is also freely available to non-contributors 
for personal or commercial use.  
While we focus here on internet-based collectives, those cases bring to mind other, 
non-virtual, cases of collaboration. This seems to be the case with the groups of sport 
enthusiasts that Franke & Shah describe (2003), where the meetings are in person, and 
information is transferred by talking or writing. Another study examines the histories of 
three sports – windsurfing, skateboarding, and snowboarding – and finds that several 
innovators published articles instructing readers on making and using the equipment (Shah, 
2000). These benefactors not only freely shared their innovations, but also bore the cost of 
communication. Similarly, Allen (1983) describes how employees of separate, often 
competing firms, have collaborated to improve the design of industrial smokestacks. He 
further point outs that many production techniques in the nineteenth century were 
developed through collective invention.  An essential feature of collective invention is the 
free and open revealing of technical information to actual and potential competitors.  In the 
specific case cited, English iron and steel companies freely revealed blast furnace designs to 
their competitors, so that other firms could extend and improve upon the original design as 
they built new facilities.  Allen argues that this behavior allowed cumulative advance, and 
suggests that firms might often desire such behavior. A similar pattern of informal, 
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personally based exchange of information between engineers of different firms is described 
by von Hippel (1987), and Saxenian (1996) argues that such patterns of collaboration 
distinguishes Silicon Valley from other industrial clusters. 
The different forms taken by these collective should not masquerade the similarities 
between them. Common to these cases is that they involve action with significant economic 
impact, carried out by loosely bounded collectives, rather than by firms or other formal 
organizations. All of these collectives operate in concert to accomplish innovation goals that 
may have great economic significance, and accomplishment of those goals is often their 
primary raison d'être. The significance is clear: real products are created, services are offered, 
and economic rents are appropriated or lost. Because data is so limited, this article 
concentrates on the internet-based cases of open collective innovation. 
Theory to match these developments has been slow to emerge. There have been 
sporadic attempts to explain the viability of open source software, but little on other, similar 
phenomena.  Explanations seem to take one of two routes. One, they would attempt to 
show that contributors have gained directly from donating their work to a collective, viewing 
the action as purely self-interested. In an exemplar of that approach, Lerner & Tiorle 
(2002:212-213) discuss motivation under the presumption that "a programmer participates in 
a project, whether commercial or open source, only if she derives a net benefit (broadly 
defined) from engaging in the activity." After reviewing three cases of open source 
applications, web server Apache, programming language Perl, and e-mail application 
Sendmail, they conclude that programmers reap reputational benefits that transform into 
better professional placing. However, as Nobel laureate in economics Amartya K. Sen points 
out in his classical “rational fools” paper (1977), an assumption that any action by an 
individual is meant to increase her utility is a tautological statement, one that cannot be 
refuted, and thus does not meet the requirements of positivistic scientific theory (Popper 
1959; 1963). Further more, the self-interest argument fails to explain how the action of a 
massive number of individuals is coordinated to produce the complex products or services 
eventually produced. If individuals care only about their own learning or reputation, it 
remains unexplained how it is that we see division of labor, detailed discussion, support 
materials, and high degree of coordination. In other words, the organization of collective 
action is overlooked in the self-interest explanation. 
Others have taken a different path, arguing that work is produced by communities of 
enthusiasts. The communal organization, it has been argued, avoids the inefficiencies of a 
strong intellectual property regime and benefits from implementing concurrent design and 
testing of software modules (Kogut and Metiu 2001). While some scholars argue that virtual 
communities are similar to non-virtual communities in many ways, it is not clear that the 
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collectives discussed here are communities in the sociological sense. Rather than embracing 
members in support and resources (cf. Wellman 1979; Wellman and Wortley 1990), these 
collectives are much more goal-oriented than one would expect from a community, where 
the purpose of collective action is preservation of primary social relations, rather than the 
attainment of an external goal. Thus, they resemble informal organizations much more than 
communities. The view of such entities as informal organizations is further supported by 
their elaborate mechanisms of coordination and governance, which allow a large number of 
individuals to collaborate on projects efficiently, while accommodating multiple goals 
through on-going negotiations (Raymond 1999).  
In this study, we selected a case that involves large-scale coordinated action with 
significant economic impact, but does not fit neatly in either category, and therefore begs 
theoretical development. The prospects of personal gain through employment are null, as 
the activity is illegal. On the other hand, the collective is so goal-oriented that any personal 
communication is frowned upon as “off topic”, i.e. not serving the organizational goals. 
Rather than presume self-interest or some communal goals, we examine and describe the 
collective and the way actions are coordinated and executed.  
We are primarily interested in understanding the survival and effectiveness of these 
collectives. As noted, it is not clear how individual self-interest action is coordinated. 
Moreover, economists have typically predicted that free-riding, or abuse of common 
resource by non-contributors, would lead to a “tragedy of the commons”, and eventual 
collapse of collective action (Hardin 1968). But empirically we find that products and 
services are public, and anyone is free to use them. Free riding is prevalent, as openly 
acknowledged by contributors, but these collectives not collapse, and some even seem to 
thrive, producing products and services that require a great degree of coordination and 
organization, whether this is an open source product or a file sharing service of dubious 
legality. 
Based on the data, we offer a four legged framework that draws on research in 
economic sociology and behavioral economics. We argue that the survival of cooperation 
despite known free riding has to do with 1) the nature of the exchanged good – economic 
goods that are non-rival are more likely to be exchanged in an open system, and 2) the (non) 
identifiability of (defectors) beneficiaries encourages cooperative behavior and discourages 
costly punishments. Further, we argue that the efficiency in production is achieved through 
3) the mode of exchange – generalized exchange is more conducive to innovative work than 
direct exchange, and 4) by institutional mechanisms allow these collective to enjoy some of 
the benefits of formal organizations, while preserving their unique advantages. 
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Method 
Choice of Research Site 
Empirical work on cases of collective open source innovation is sparse, and theory 
has only begun to form. Even research that looked into such cases is parsimonious on the 
minutiae of the process involved: how participants meet, coordinate, and produce (an 
exception is O'mahony 2002). The paucity of previous research and the lack of firm 
theoretical framing have led us to adopt qualitative research methods, which are more 
appropriate for the inductive development of theory, when meaning, process, context, and 
unanticipated phenomena are uncovered and explained (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 
and Corbin 1990). Qualitative methods are suitable for theoretical development, as they may 
lead to the discovery of a novel construct or unknown link between existing constructs. The 
hypotheses generated from qualitative research may then be tested using statistical methods, 
as we intend to do in a follow-up study. 
We began the study by broadly surveying venues for collective open innovation on 
the internet. For this purpose, we have spent about 25 hours of observation, spread thrice a 
week over four months, exploring various forms of economic activity on-line. We have 
familiarized ourselves with the field by visiting and observing a wide range of venues, 
including chat and discussion rooms, topical web sites, and a great number of Usenet 
newsgroups, both textual and binary. For comparison, we have examined commercial web 
sites that offered space for interaction, and held 14 interviews with users of such venues. 
The interviewees included college students, in the undergraduate and graduate levels, 
computer professionals, and internet hobbyists. Both the observations and the interviews 
were meant to give us an impression of how individuals use the internet for collective 
innovation, when, with whom, and for what purpose. We wrote field notes or transcripts 
during, or immediately after, each observation or interview. 
After gaining a broad impression of the landscape, we began to contemplate the 
choice of a specific research site
1. The internet offers various means for communication and 
coordination. For the purposes of this research, we sought research sites that were a native 
venue for social interaction, allowed obstructed observation, and featured overt interaction 
among individuals. As a result, three types of sites were excluded: 1) sites that primarily 
facilitate commercial activity, either directly or indirectly; 2) sites that were created by 
organizations that are not internet-based, even if non-commercial, as such sites tend to be 
                                                 
1 The term refers to a venue where studied activities take place, which may be psychical (i.e. office) or virtual 
(i.e. a distant-learning service), and not to be confused with website, which is a collection of electronic pages. 
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extension of existing practices; 3) sites that are exclusionary though the use of login 
mechanisms, and thus not conducive to observation. The remaining sites were categorized 
based on three factors: type of communication, its life span, and its typical nature and 
content. While this might not be an exhaustive categorization, it allowed us to map the 
available sites along the uniqueness and significance of the data available. Based on the 
selection criteria, several site categories were considered (see table 1 for summary): 
1.  Chat and discussion rooms – Electronic venues that offer synchronous (real-time) 
discussion among users, through a textual or graphic interface. The messages posted are 
seen immediately by all of the participants, and are typically kept on the hosting 
computer (server) for a few minutes only. The interaction is typically casual and personal 
in nature (Danet, Ruedenberg-Wright and Rosenbaum-Tamari 1998), with low economic 
value
2. Accordingly, the research addressing chat rooms has done so mostly from a 
psychological or communicational angle (e.g. Marvin 1995). 
2.  Topical Web sites – Sites that were voluntarily created to disseminate information to 
others with similar interest or tastes. The topics are highly varied, ranging from technical 
to casual to obscure, and the format can resemble a detailed hobbyist magazine. While 
the information can be economically valuable (e.g. instructions for car engine 
modification) the communication is mostly unidirectional, thus the degree of interactivity 
is low
3. The impressions or reactions of visitors are not recorded, and the observable 
interaction is limited.  
3.  Usenet newsgroups – attractive mostly to computer professional and hobbyists, Usenet 
does not receive much public attention, but has grown to host over 60,000 discussion 
forums, each known as a newsgroup (Hauben and Hauben 1997). Participants in a 
newsgroup can read messages posted by others, post messages in response, or begin a 
new conversation of messages (“thread”). The interaction is asynchronous: messages are 
typically kept on the server for at least a couple of days, and other participants can read 
them within that time. Unlike electronic “mailing lists”, newsgroups can be joined (or 
just watched) by any internet user, and the discussion is public. Since the messages are 
accessible for several days or weeks
4, it is easy to follow and participate in the discussion. 
In addition to text-based discussion boards, Usenet also features boards that are devoted 
                                                 
2 The term refers to the hypothetical price associated with such information. A possible exception is the on-line 
investors clubs, where the discussants exchange opinions and speculations about stock picking. However, the 
economic value of the advice given is often dubious. 
3 Interactive sites, where users can exchange messages with each other, would belong either in category 1 or in 
category 3. 
4 The life span of a message depends on the frequency and volume of message posting in the newsgroup, as 
message are kept on a “first in first out” basis. 
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to the sharing of digital goods (known as “binaries”), such as pictures, video and DVD 
movies, audio books, software, and music files. Typically, a participant would post a 
message containing the digital good as a file attachment, so that any interested user can 
save an identical copy of the file to his local computer. Social interaction regarding this 
practice takes place in several supplemental discussion newsgroups. These newsgroups 
facilitate sharing through administration, exchange of knowledge, solicitation of requests 
for a specific title or file, and enforcement of the newsgroup norms. In such textual 
newsgroups, participants would discuss, for example, how to optimally transfer a music 
track from a compact disc to a digital file or how to administrate the newsgroup. They 
would not discuss, however, the qualities of a song or an artist, as these are considered 
digressive to the purpose of the newsgroup – sharing. The newsgroups are highly 
interactive and publicly accessible. Since the communication is asynchronous, the 
newsgroups serve as a storage space for digital goods. Depending on the server, the 
goods are accessible for several days or even weeks. The material posted is often 
copyrighted, and the posters are thus required to both overcome the copy protection 
often built into digital goods, and take the inherent risk in offering such materials (See 
appendix 1 for a sample of the message headers). 
4.  Peer-to-peer sharing applications – The technology of permanent connection 
between two computers or more is not new, but the appearance of peer-to-peer software 
applications that allow direct sharing among internet users has led to a substantial 
increase in the number of participates (Levine 2000). The most well known of these 
applications are probably Napster (Kover 2000) and its predecessor Kazaa, which defied 
law suits seeking to shut it as well (New York Times 2003). These applications and their 
ilk, users estimated to be in the millions, allow one to search and download music from 
other users’ computers. While the degree of interactivity in use is potentially high, as the 
search and the transfer are synchronous, the transfer can be fully carried out by 
computers, making human communication unnecessary. If such interaction happens, it 
takes place in private, most often in one-to-one conversations. The information available 
to a researcher is therefore quite limited
5.  
After consideration of the characteristics of the various venues available for research, 
we have decided to examine the Usenet newsgroups, and especially the discussion groups 
that facilitate sharing.  The economic value of the goods offered, high interactivity, universal 
accessibility, observability, and the public nature of the venue made it a good starting point 
for a qualitative inquiry.  
                                                 
5 It is still intriguing that a user is willing to allow complete strangers to access her computer and download 
goods, and warrants additional research, notwithstanding the difficulties in observing such private interaction. 
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Site type  Type of communication Life span  Typical interaction 
and content 
Chat and 
discussion 
rooms 
Synchronous, highly 
interactive 
Several minutes  Casual and personal; 
low economic value 
Topical 
Websites 
Unidirectional, low 
interactivity 
Unlimited  Covers specific topic in 
detail; Potentially 
economically value 
Usenet 
newsgroups 
Asynchronous, highly 
interactive 
Few days to several 
weeks 
Discussion and digital 
goods concentrated on 
the newsgroup topic. 
“Off topic” comments 
are frowned upon.  
Peer-to-peer 
sharing 
applications 
Synchronous. 
Communication between 
users is possible, but not 
needed for transferring 
digital goods 
Content is stored on 
users’ computers, 
and accessible only 
as long as user is 
connected to the 
internet 
Digital content; 
Interaction is not 
necessary for transfer 
and commonly done in 
private  
Table 1: Selection of Research Site 
 
Description of the Site 
Newsgroups are extremely popular venue for interaction on the internet. While data 
on usage has been typically difficult to obtain, a recent reliable survey by the Pew Internet & 
American Life Project (Lenhart, Horrigan and Fallows 2004) has found that 20% of the 
surveyed internet users have visited a newsgroup. This translates to roughly 24 million 
people in the US alone. Fifty one percent of those who visited have also made some sort of 
contribution to the newsgroup by posting. While the participation in newsgroups is high, it is 
likely that the results still underestimate posting by users. The survey has been conducted in 
early 2004, almost a year after the music industry has began suing individuals over copyright 
violations with much publicity. It is plausible that individuals were less inclined to reveal 
participation in an activity that may lend them in court. 
We conducted the work described here in three newsgroups devoted to the sharing 
of digital music files in the MP3 format. One is devoted only to discussion, covering 
administrative, technical, and social topics, as described in depth below. The other one lists 
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requests from users for specific music tracks, and the third one contains the binaries, the 
actual shared digital files. The discussion newsgroup, which is the only designated among the 
digital music newsgroups, is quite active. During the study period, 2,000 messages were 
posted monthly on average. It should be stressed that the access to all newsgroups is 
universal – any Internet user can access it using easily obtainable, often free, newsreader 
software. A user entering the newsgroup may announce her presence by posting a message, 
but may also choose to remain invisible to other participants, and can do so even while 
browsing and accessing messages and files. The newsgroups are not moderated: users are 
free to post whatever they desire and nobody but the original poster can delete a message, 
even a grossly inappropriate one. 
Study Design 
We did not enter the field without caution. While a new arena for human interaction 
is always interesting in itself, its appearance does not guarantee new forms of social 
interaction. Indeed, our null hypothesis was a conservative one (Becker 1998): we expected 
to find that a pattern of interaction that would resemble social practices elsewhere, possibly 
with some minor differences. Following guidelines for inductive research, we remained as 
descriptive as possible, until a major theme emerged from the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967; 
Miles and Huberman 1984). Only when we found a public, organized, and recurring 
innovation in connection with economically valuable goods, did we concentrate our 
attention on that topic.  
Ethics. When conducting research, especially of the qualitative type, a researcher has 
to strike a balance between giving full report to the readers and protecting the privacy of 
participants. This problem is alleviated here: since the setting is as public as it can be, 
participants know well that their messages are universally accessible. In response, they mask 
their identity by using pseudonyms and phony e-mail address. Although there is no 
expectation for privacy or obvious risk in reporting the location of the newsgroup and the 
participants aliases, and reporting of public interaction is generally acceptable under ethical 
guidelines (American Sociological Association 2001), we chose to not to disclose the exact 
location of the site and names (or pseudonyms), as the participants expressed anxiety over 
unwanted attention following publicity. 
Phase One: Fieldwork 
Phase one consisted of data collection in the field, using content analysis, semi-
structured interviews, and electronic mail (e-mail) correspondence.  
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Content Analysis 
Using a combination of news reader software applications (Microsoft Outlook 
Newsreader, Netscape Messenger, and Forté Agent), we spent eight to ten hours per week 
observing and documenting the happenings in the newsgroup. In addition, we spent about 
two hours each week examining the Binaries newsgroups, where the digital goods were 
actually offered and shared, and the textual newsgroup devoted to participants’ requests for 
the posting of specific material. We also followed structural changes, such as the addition of 
newsgroups. 
As noted earlier, the action in the group is expressed through posted messages that 
join into discussion threads, and digital files. The number of messages was overwhelming at 
an average of 2,000 per month, and required the development of a systematic method for 
coding and analysis. We began by screening all of the messages posted by reading at least the 
subject line of each message. We then moved to note whether the message was part of, or 
incited, a wider discussion. Following that, the message was then categorized on a scale 
between one and three, based on its topic (technical vs. non-technical) and the number of 
replies it received (no response vs. much response). Following the scale, we coded all of the 
messages that incited a conversation, regardless of the topic. We also coded all of the 
messages that were non-technical in nature and received some response. We read only some 
of the messages that were purely technical and received little response or those that were not 
replied. We estimate that 450 messages were read each month during the observation period. 
 
Response 
Content 
Low 
>2 replies 
High 
≤2 replies 
Technical Not  Coded  Coded 
Non-Technical Coded  Coded 
Table 2: Selection Rule for Content Analysis  
A challenge to the comprehensiveness of the data might have arisen if the publicly 
observable interactions used here were just a marginal part of a wider interaction, which 
might have taken place mostly in private. In other words, one might suspect that the 
messages posted in the newsgroup are just meant to create an initial contact between users. 
Allegedly, once such contact is established, the interaction moves into private venues such as 
personal electronic mail or files exchanges. The data, however, do not provide support for 
this scenario: we find that participants have little or no interaction outside of the group. 
First, interviewees were asked specifically about interaction with other participants outside of 
the group through other means, such as electronic mail, phone, or face-to-face meetings. All 
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of them pointed out that such interaction rarely takes place, and is limited to few instances 
of electronic mail exchange. One said: “I purposely do not get too personal with any one in the group”. 
To our question, he explained that he was comfortable with computer-mediated interaction, 
and did not aspire to go beyond that, into face-to-face relations. Second, most of the 
participants of the newsgroup use fake electronic mail addresses, so personal replies are 
impossible. Third, some of the messages in the newsgroup discuss personal issues, giving 
support to the impression that no issues are discussed in private. Based on this evidence, we 
concluded that an observer could get a near complete picture of the social activity in the 
newsgroup by reading the posted messages. Furthermore, an observer has access to the exact 
same information available to the participants. This form of archived reality is obviously 
quite different from more common research settings, where the researcher can observe only 
bits of the social reality, and might have access that is less than that of the participants 
themselves. Thus, the plain nature of this social reality eases some of the limitations 
commonly associated with observation as a research method. While it also limits the kinds of 
interaction possible among the participants, this is a result of the very nature of the field, and 
not a limitation of the method. 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
About two months and half into the observation, we posted a message to the 
newsgroup participants, explaining our interest and expressing our wish to communicate 
with them in person. The message drew responses that ranged from disbelief to wariness 
about exposure, but resulted in several valuable contacts. Overtime, we managed to create 
rapport with several members of the group, who became informants. 
Data and Analysis  
Interaction and Coordination of Action 
The purpose of the newsgroup is defined in the introduction to the group’s 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) document: “This group is for the discussion of MP3s, MP3 
technology and other MP3 related topics” (Anonymous 2000). In addition to the production and 
sharing of digital goods, we observed supporting institutions of several kinds: answering 
requests for information, discussing control and administration, enforcing group norms, and 
infrequent casual chatting among participants.  
The practice of sharing. The stated purpose of the group was sharing: making 
digital music MP3 files available to others by placing them in an open, publicly accessible 
space, commonly in response to requests from others. Just like requests for advice or 
assistance, requests for specific pieces of music are posted in the appropriate newsgroup. 
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Participants may read the request, and – if they posses the requested track – can post the file 
in the suitable newsgroup to the attention of the requester.  
Sharing requires the production and posting of MP3 files, which is not an 
instantaneous or trivial process. Starting with a music CD, a member converted the music 
tracks into digital music files, which can be stored on a computer’s hard drive. Creating a 
faithful digital representation of recorded music required much space: at least 10 MB of data 
for each minute of CD quality music track. Since such large files are impractical to share in a 
newsgroup, the member compressed those files using the MP3 compression algorithm, 
which can be found on-line. Although some combined software packages exist, the 
production process still requires some technical knowledge and computer time. Once the 
compressed music files are ready, the member connected to the Usenet and posts the files to 
the attention of the requester. Since these files are typically still 3-6 MB in size, they are first 
sliced into smaller pieces, using a pre-specified format. Only then they can be posted to the 
newsgroup. Posting of typical music files, containing 4-5 minutes of music, would take 15-30 
minutes of Internet connection time for the typical modem user, making the whole process 
as long as 60 minutes
6. In spite of the lengthy process, participants in the MP3 hierarchy 
devoted a great deal of attention to supplying others’ requests for specific music files, 
although most of the requesters are total strangers to them. Even when not requested, 
participants voluntarily shared music from their own collection, or files that they had found 
somewhere else. 
This non-self-interested eagerness to share is reflected in one of the interesting 
discussions that developed in the newsgroup. Knight has attempted to find out whether 
anyone reads and fulfills the requests posted on the request newsgroup. Holding thousands 
of requests, this is one of the busiest newsgroups in the MP3 hierarchy – not an intimate or 
personal setting. Knight’s question, which seemed demeaning to some, sparked a long 
exchange. A few participants replied stating that they regularly read and fulfill requests, 
whenever possible. Below is one of those replies, preceded by the original posting: 
“I am curious.  You don't have to reply to the group. If you think this is a worthless thread, just reply to me 
personally.  Is there anyone out there who reads every request in the group? (this includes every posted list as 
well as every header).  If so, how many days running have you read every request? Thank You, Knight” 
 
”My hand is up!  I try to scan through every request just about every day. Most of us do have real lives, so if I 
don't see and fill every request every day, please pardon. Do I open up every posted list?  Nope, no way, 
especially the L O N G ones. I also don't care for crossposted requests because of the potential for harm to the 
                                                 
6 The estimation was done as the observations were made. Improvements in technology are likely to make the 
process quicker. 
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text groups. I try to remind folks of this. 
Do I fill every request we could fill?  Nope.  How many?  If you go looking for my nym [alias] to see how 
many I have posted in recent memory, you will find zero.  Some folks use a different nym for posting 
Binaries.  It is a good habit. Question back at ya.  How many requests have you filled?” 
The response to the question posted by Knight exemplifies that sharing is obvious. 
Questioning the inclination of the members to share or their willingness to satisfy is 
inappropriate or even insulting. However, during the entire length of observation, this was 
the only instance of discussing the greater issue of sharing. To us, as an outsider, it was 
striking that while discussions in the newsgroup dealt with the minutiae of administration 
and technology, questions about sharing never arose. There was also little discussion of the 
reasons for participation in the newsgroup, or the justification for sharing copyrighted work.  
Since no discussion of sharing took place – it was simply taken for granted – we 
brought up the topic with some participants. For Dan, sharing seemed natural, and no 
source for wonder. He plainly said:  
“I love music and I'm fascinated with computer technology. I also like to help people, so that's why I 
participate in the group.” 
Jerry, another participant, seconded this seemingly altruistic approach:  
“The medium makes sharing imperative. Trading is frowned upon because of its mercenary and 
selfish overtones. It's not yours to begin with, so deriving personal benefit from its distribution is viewed as 
criminal. That is an ethic unique to Usenet.” 
Jerry knew that many users benefit from the shared music, but not all contribute 
back: 
“There is often cooperation, so that mutual benefits may be realized, but there are untold thousands 
who are benefiting from that collaboration.” 
For him, however, the fact that thousands were benefiting from the collaboration 
without contributing was not a reason to abandon the altruistic approach, or doubt its 
benefits. 
 
Requests for information. The accumulation and dissemination of knowledge and 
information are two of the primary functions of a newsgroup (Hauben and Hauben 1997). 
Indeed, participants in the newsgroup devoted about half of their conversations to this 
purpose. At the time of the study, MP3 technology was not part of a polished commercial 
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product, but typically included in open source or free software
7. Even when commercial 
products were involved, users worked to extend the functionality of the software, either to 
solve specific issues or just out of curiosity, in a manner similar to that of other users-
innovators (Franke and Shah 2003; Von Hippel 1986; 1998; 2001). Such modified programs 
were also offered for sharing, and those that had picked them sought technical support on 
the newsgroup. Hence, there was a constant flow of questions from users regarding use of 
software, technology, and related topics. Other users, who might have run into similar 
problems, or knew the software well enough to answer, shared their knowledge by posting 
replies to the newsgroup. In one case, a participant asked how to play an MP3 file before it 
was completely transmitted to his computer (=“downloaded”). He posted a question in the 
newsgroup, explaining what he was attempting to achieve. Within less than two hours, the 
poster received four replies, some of them quite long, which suggested ways to accomplish 
that. After trying one of the suggestions, the participant posted another message to the 
group, explaining what he had done, and requested further help. This request was again 
answered in length. The exchange of messages took place in a short time: the first response 
appeared less than two hours after the original message was sent. The entire thread of 
discussion, which contained about six pages of printed text supplied from eight different 
users, ended within less than five hours. This intensity of discussion, and the number of 
people involved, were quite common, and suggested that there was a significant number of 
knowledgeable participants that read the messages frequently, probably several times a day.  
Discussion of appropriate ethics and control. The FAQ document contained 
more than a statement of purpose. It was a collectively written compendium of information, 
knowledge, and rules of behavior. It took the form of an electronic document guide, 
encompassing over 60 printed pages, whose stated mission was to serve as a collection of 
answers to common questions, easing the toll of answering repeated questions and educating 
new participants. But it also served as a guide of conduct for all of the newsgroups devoted 
to digital music in the MP3 format. For example, the part of the FAQ that lists technical 
requirements for the files posted (e.g. “Use a high quality [MP3] encoder”) also contains 
guidelines for conduct, such as: “Limit your posts to 75 megabytes per day
8”; “Check your MP3s 
before posting them”; “Don't post Binaries in the discussion group and vise-versa” (Anonymous 2000).  
The FAQ was meticulously written, organized in a question and answer format, and 
included a table of contents where each question is listed and indexed according to its 
                                                 
7 The situation has changed since, as more user-friendly commercial products have appeared. Consequently, the 
discussion in the newsgroups has moved into topics that are beyond the capabilities of the available commercial 
software. 
8 It is remarkable that the participants found it necessary to set a maximum limit to the quantity that can be 
shared daily by a single participant. Apparently, over-sharing can also be a problem. 
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section and serial number. The answers often contained references to other topics or links to 
websites, all in an encyclopedic style. Colors and boxes are used to distinguish between 
different topics or between text and names. It seems that a great effort was put into the 
FAQ, but no writer name was listed. Rather, the interested reader is directed to contact “the 
folks who update the FAQ”.  
This document can be seen as a participative product of the newsgroup, expressing 
the collective view regarding technology, hierarchy, and conduct. It is a bureaucratic 
institution (Weber 1947) that documented knowledge and described structure. It also set 
concrete, specific rules, and explained the rationale behind them. The participants’ 
commitment to the FAQ was evident through the frequent references they made to it, for 
example to support a point made in an on-line discussion. We observed it being used to 
direct a new user to look up an answer to a common question, but also when an argument 
about posting policy erupted. Some participants even added the FAQ address as their 
electronic mail signature, so that a polite reminder to refer to the FAQ appears in every 
message they send. One of the posters, who used the alias “FAQ-Man”, posted daily 
excerpts from the FAQ to all of the newsgroups, as a form of education for “newbies” 
(=new users) and as a way to remind veterans of the group norms. 
The newsgroup norms are not only clearly expressed, but are also strictly enforced. 
An example is the case of Bob, who set a target of posting one album per day for sharing with 
the other participants. According to the messages exchanged, some unspecified personal 
matters prevented Bob from meeting this voluntary goal. To keep up with the self-set pace, 
he requested permission to post two albums per day, until he returns to schedule. The 
response to his request is harsh – the rule stands. Below is the original request: 
“Today I  find myself in a rock and a hard place. I missed a days worth of posting due to a busy 
day, and am 1 album behind schedule. I don't like posting 2 albums in 1 day, but would like to maintain 
the Alan Parsons Project and Boston-scheduled posting plan post that I created so that those who may be 
following it may reference it and know that it is accurate. My humble apologies. I am going to bend the rule 
and do a 2 album post today.  I shall do my utmost to ensure that this does not happen again, and continue 
to do my part for Usenet. Thanks for your understanding, Bob :-)” 
Bob’s intention was to benefit others through his sharing. But since many other 
users wanted to contribute as well, a maximum of 75 MB per day (about one album) was set 
in the FAQ. Accordingly, Bob’s request to suspend the limit temporarily was met with 
aggressive objection:  
I don't understand, and I don't care about your schedule and whether or not you keep to it. 
The cap is 75 MB/24 hours! Period. End of discussion. 
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Since the newsgroup is open, nobody could have prevented Bob from offering as 
much as he wanted to. However, the group’s governance mechanism were strong enough to 
assure that Bob saw it as necessary to receive permission before offering his album collection. 
In an interview, one frequent participant – Ben – justified the reaction by stressing the need 
for order in the potentially chaotic environment of the Internet: 
“True consideration and respect for its beginnings, and a mature approach to binary-text purity and 
balance is the agenda of the true friend of Usenet. Spam
9, text in binary groups, Binaries in text groups, 
unrestrained uploading via cable
10 and other conduct oblivious to Usenet's limited storage resources and the 
interdependency of Usenet's elemental parts and the self-imposed guidelines is perhaps its greatest threat, and 
all but one of those, Spam, originate from within, at the hands of unskilled or uncaring part-time 
participants.” 
While requests for exemption are often denied, and the requester is “flamed”
11, the 
rules can be changed, but only in a formal way – after public debate and even a vote, if 
necessary. About a quarter of the newsgroup discussion is devoted to policy proposals, 
discussion of such proposals, and debates about the enforcement of norms. In one instance, 
a reader proposed to create a new newsgroup that would be dedicated for posting of music 
from the current decade. Such newsgroups already existed for each one of the decades from 
the 1940s throughout the 1990s. A long discussion developed, with about twenty users 
seriously debating the proposal. Rounds of messages were exchanged, with arguments for 
and against. Finally, the emerging consensus was against the proposal. The rationale for 
rejection was that it was premature to create such group.  
The established processes of organization and decision-making evoked feelings of 
pride and righteousness among participants. Ben observed that:  
“This playing field is level. Those whose reason and logic seem sound gain support from equals. It is 
a pure form of self-government of and by the people using the forum, with the adult democratic majority 
teaching, coaching, and yes, scolding, and at times ridiculing when anarchy, chaos and self-serving dictatorship 
at the expense of others is perceived to be the poster's agenda.” 
Enforcement of group norms. In spite of the stated rules and procedures, and the 
expressed desire of the participants to promote order on the newsgroup, the open nature of 
the Usenet makes any form of control difficult. Consider, for example, a user that violates 
the principles of cataloging when offering music by “The Doors” in an area devoted to the 
                                                 
9 Unsolicited electronic mail, which sent in bulk to either e-mail addresses or newsgroups.  
10 Cable modem allows high-speed connection to the Internet, allowing a user to offer a comparably huge 
quantity of goods to share. 
11 “Flaming” is Internet jargon for giving someone a verbal lashing in public (electronic) space, e.g. in a public 
newsgroup, rather than in a personal e-mail message. 
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offering of music from the 1990s. Nobody can stop users from doing so, and messages that 
were inappropriately posted can be removed only by the original poster. Other participants, 
whose offered files might be removed from the server due to lack of space, can only send 
out messages to persuade the violator to cancel his own postings. It is up to him to decide 
whether to accept the request. In addition, since most of the participants post under an alias, 
often using a phony electronic mail address, violators could easily disguise or change their 
identity. In extreme cases, such as those of blatant commercial “spam”, angry participants 
might send an electronic mail complaint to the Internet service provider of the poster, 
claiming abuse of the Usenet. However, those occasions are rare, and it is unclear how 
willing are providers to deal with such complaints. Therefore, all the negative sanctions we 
observed were in the form of public scolding. Consider the following excerpt, part of a 
message exchange between two participants. The first two paragraphs are a quote from a 
message in which a participant apologized, retrospectively, for posting textual requests in 
one of the Binaries newsgroups (which are devoted to the sharing of digital files and should 
not contain textual content, as explained earlier). In the opening of this message (omitted 
here), he excused his violation by explaining that the songs he requested were needed for a 
Christmas gift. 
Subject: REQ: NEED FOR A CHRISTMAS GIFT - ANY & ALL versions of "Amazing Grace" 
- Please read 
I know it's not 'kosher' to post requests to Binaries newsgroups, but I really would like to reach the largest 
audience. Please excuse the faux-pas. 
The reply was harsh: 
 
Your faux pas is NOT excused. 
 
Well, Prof, since you went ahead and crossposted to binary groups anyway, even though you KNEW it was 
not "kosher", the requests group got trashed because someone was nice enough to honor your request without 
checking for your crossposting.  At last count there were at least 13 Binaries totaling over 40 
MEGABYTES posted to the requests group.  How many requests could have fit in that amount of 
space?  Hmm?  
Your selfish attitude now has caused lots and lots of other ”considerate posters” requests to get scrolled off 
servers just so you could get what you wanted.  Well, Merry Bleeping Christmas! 
 
How about a show of faith and an apology by canceling your original crossposted request and reposting it 
PROPERLY? 
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The participant that responded to the public apology expressed anger for audaciously 
violating the newsgroup rules, and demanded that the violator apologize and cancel his 
original request. But even if done, such a cancellation would be merely a symbolic act, for 
the damage had already been done.  
In another case, a poster not only ignored the norms of the newsgroup, but also 
mocked them in public? Henry revolted against the “FAQ Nazi”, as he called those who 
demanded him to adhere to the FAQ directives. After publicly clashing with them, Henry 
began to post messages that were meant to upset the participants: he repeatedly mailed 
nonsensical messages, impersonated participants by using their aliases, and tried to rally 
others to join him. Below is an excerpt from his mail, followed by one of the many mocking 
responses he received. 
 
>Wanna bug a FAQ Nazi? Change your name to FAQ Man]. These jerks will freak. LOL 
[=”Laughing Out Loud”] 
  
Are you at mommy and daddy's house already?!?!  Shouldn't you be studying for next week's finals?!?! 
The technological environment of Usenet, where access and posting rights are 
equally distributed to all users, makes enforcement of norms difficult. The hierarchical 
structure is completely flat, and so central supervising authority cannot exist. As explained, 
messages cannot be canceled and users cannot be ousted from a newsgroup. Users also can 
change identities at will or refrain from making their presence known to the group, thus 
limiting the exercise of normative control. In spite of the potential for chaos, the 
observations reveal rather organized and participatory social institutions, which are 
protective and participatory. Rules are set only after a public discussion, and one must 
provide rational justifications for them. When rules are broken, the violator is publicly 
scolded and must offer remorse before forgiven. Such instances were not common in the 
MP3 discussion newsgroup, but their existence serves to demonstrate how dependent the 
group was on the good will of each participant. While previous research has found this 
system to be generally effective (Smith, Mclaughlin and Osborne 1997), the organization is 
still fragile.  
 Casual Chatting. Notwithstanding the strictness with which they apply group rules 
and decisions, participants occasionally get to discuss personal topics. While casual chatting 
is not encouraged, the exchange of messages and greetings testify that some collegial 
contacts tie the participants. As said earlier, even such personal discussions take place in the 
public space of the newsgroup. On one occasion, Jerry talked about the social ties formed in 
the newsgroup: 
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“MP3 is merely a file format. This group is a social organization. It's about people and music as 
well as technique. You see many topics other than MP3 discussed. General computer and software questions 
that are somewhat related to MP3 and Usenet but could be answered in another group are broached here 
because of the social aspect of the group. One tends to ask their friends first or someone whose credibility 
they've come to trust. Because we're among friends
12 widely ranging topics and personal issues are sometimes 
discussed at length or quickly and respectfully dismissed as off topic and another more appropriate forum is 
suggested.” 
As participants have developed some knowledge of others, they sometimes applaud 
(or ridicule) messages, based on the writer’s history in the group. But instances of pure social 
interaction are not very common the newsgroup, and as Jerry noted, most of them are 
dismissed as “off topic”, i.e. digressive to the official mission of the group – sharing. 
 
Discussion 
The description above pictures a seemingly bureaucratic organization with stated and 
rational methods of control, division of labor, and some informal social bonding. It can be 
easy to forget that the members have not met face to face, and do not know the real 
identities of their counterparts. Moreover, anyone can freely enter or exit the organizational 
boundaries, and users can limit themselves to reading messages or copying files, remaining 
invisible to others. Even visible participants, those who share information and files, can hide, 
or change their identity at will. Nevertheless, individuals spend time and thought in 
answering questions and providing explanations, creating policy and rules of conduct, 
communicating them to other and enforcing them – all in addition to engaging in the 
primary purpose of the collective – sharing digital music. 
The information, administration, and communication provided by the organization 
are beneficial to the participants. Their questions are answered, they have access to MP3 files 
that are neatly organized by era or genre, and can receive information about technological 
developments or products. Moreover, the transferred files have a clear economic value, 
which can be approximated by the market price for commercial music goods, such as 
compact discs. Unlike in the market, where transactions happen between individual agents, 
here transactions here flow from an individual to a collective, and vice versa. We did not 
observe any rent payment to the holder of the goods, neither monetary nor through 
exchange of goods. So was the case for the advice providers, norm enforcers, and the 
keepers of the FAQ – a summary of organizational knowledge. They are all volunteers, who 
do not receive any wages for the group or any other tangible benefits in return for their work. 
                                                 
12 It is telling that Jerry refers to the newsgroup participants as “friends”, bearing in mind that he has never met 
them in person, nor knows their real name, gender, nationality, or age. 
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Clearly, this setting differs much from traditional or electronic markets. This is especially 
remarkable as the technological environment – transparent, open, and anonymous – gives it 
the potential to become a perfectly competitive market, as can be observed in other on-line 
venues, such as sites for auctions, e.g. eBay.  
To account for this case, and to similar cases such as open source software and 
collective invention, we suggest a four-legged framework. We argue that the survival of 
cooperation despite known free riding has to do with 1) the nature of the exchanged good – 
economic goods that are non-rival are more likely to be exchanged in an open system, and 2) 
the (non) identifiability of (defectors) beneficiaries encourages cooperative behavior and 
discourages costly punishments. Further, we argue that the efficiency in production is 
achieved through 1) the mode of exchange – generalized exchange is more conducive to 
innovative work than direct exchange, and 2) by institutional mechanisms allow these 
collective to enjoy some of the benefits of formal organizations, while preserving their 
unique advantages. 
A social dilemma can be identified in all of the cases discussed here. A social 
dilemma is a situation in which cooperation would produce desirable results for each 
individual in a collective, but each one can also derive benefit from defecting from 
cooperation, and benefiting from the contributions of others without contributing herself 
(Baron 2000; Ostrom 1990). In his “tragedy of the commons”, Hardin (1968) predicted that 
this incentive structure would lead to defection and eventual collapse of the system. 
However, laboratory evidence as well as fieldwork (e.g. O'mahony 2002; Orr 1990) has 
shown that at least some individuals are cooperative. That is, even when faced with the 
possibility of defecting, they would prefer to cooperate (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). 
We suggest that two elements alleviate the expected “tragedy of the commons” in 
these cases: one has to do with the nature of the goods, and another has to do with the 
identifiably of the participants, both cooperators and defectors.  First, the goods exchanged 
are non-rival, and thus free-riding doesn’t result in a direct loss to contributors. A good is 
considered non-rival if for any level of production the cost of providing it to a marginal 
(additional) individual is zero (Cornes & Sandler, 1986). Non-rivalry does not imply that the 
total production costs are low, it merely points out that the marginal production costs are low. 
Some non-rival goods, such as national defense, can be extremely expensive to produce, but 
the cost is insensitive to the number of beneficiaries. Formally put, sharing a pure non-rival 
good does not decrease the utility of any individual from consumption. In the case described 
here, sharing a digital music file does not decrease the contributor’s benefit from it. 
Technology allows her to create a perfect copy and share it, while still enjoying the original. 
This would not be possible with money or food, two exemplars of rival goods. With non-
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rival goods, if at least some of the other participants are cooperative, one can expect positive 
returns. 
Non-rivalry alleviates some of the damage done by free riding, because even massive 
free riding does not decrease the availability of goods to others. While if the goods are rival, 
free riders will bear no cost but enjoy all benefits, while cooperators will still bear the original 
cost, and receive the same benefits
13. Obviously, a system with more contributors will likely 
be better off, but the point here is that when the goods are non-rival, the tragedy of the 
commons would be avoided even with free riding. Hence, 
 
Proposition 1: Collective open innovation is more sustainable when the product or 
service created is a non-rival good.  
 
While the nature of the good may alleviate the potentially devastating results of free 
riding, it does not resolve the psychological distress associated with knowing that one is 
taken advantage of or “being a sucker”. Research in behavioral economics shows that people 
want to be treated fairly. The many variations of the ultimatum game (Camerer and Thaler 
1995), where a subject is asked to split a sum of money between herself and another subject, 
has shown that individuals tend to split close to equal sizes. When the split favored the 
decision maker, the other subject refused the transaction, even if that meant forfeiting any 
gain (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986). Researchers concluded that individuals 
preferred to be treated fairly, and are willing to suffer a cost in order to punish those 
behaving unfairly (Fehr and Gächter 2000). Therefore, the non-rival nature of the goods 
does not explain why the participants do not take action to limit free riding, not necessarily 
out of economic loss, but due to conception of violated fairness. While the loss may not be 
direct, a violation of the sense of fairness may lead individuals to abandon cooperation as 
well. 
However, recent work in economic psychology shows that individuals are less 
inclined to punish an unspecific offender than a specific one, and are more likely to assist a 
specific needy other than an unspecific one (Small and Loewenstein 2003a; 2003b). In a 
laboratory setting, merely the knowledge that another specific individual was in need has 
induced a significant increase in help offered, although the assistance was costly to the 
benefactor, and the beneficiary was anonymous as no personal information was revealed. In 
a follow-up field study, the researchers found again that the mere identification of a needy 
                                                 
13 If the good is not pure non-rival, cooperators may receive lower benefits due to the presence of defectors 
(Cornes and Sandler 1986). 
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family had resulted in greater contribution compared to a situation were a non-specific 
contribution was requested. The same tendency was observed in the opposite case. Merely 
the information that an individual was involved in deviating behavior resulted in greater 
punishment compared to a when a specific individual was not identified. In many of 
instances described here, the beneficiary is specific: an individual is making a specific request. 
On the other hand, the free riders remain invisible and non-identifiable, provoking much 
weaker reactions of anger. Jerry, the informant quoted earlier, knows that free riding 
happens, but this is not enough to provoke him and his colleague to abandon cooperation. 
Hence, 
 
Proposition 2: Collective open innovation is more sustainable when the beneficiaries 
are identifiable while defectors are non-identifiable.  
 
Thus far, we have attempted to explain why cooperation does not collapse, and how 
the tragedy of the commons is averted. However, even if collective open innovation is 
sustainable, it is not clear why the phenomena have been so effective in its economic 
ramification: how the open source movement has produced a viable alternative to 
commercial software, and how music sharing has become a serious threat to the profitability 
of media companies. To explain the unique aspects of efficiency, we turn to the two other 
elements of the proposed framework. First, the exchange is carried out under a regime of 
generalized exchange, which is superior to direct exchange for the type of goods and goals 
involved in these cases. Second, institutional mechanisms provide means of coordination 
and governance of the collective effort. 
Direct exchange, a standard feature of economic theory, is a transaction between two 
actors where both give and receive from each other, either identical or different goods, either 
immediately or sequentially. Direct exchange “includes any system which effectively or 
functionally divides the group into a certain number of pair of exchange units so that, for 
any one pair X-Y there is a reciprocal relationship” (Lévi-Strauss 1969 [1949]:146). Buying a 
loaf of bread or letting a friend know about a work opportunity are all cases of direct 
exchange. Homans (1958) drew on micro-economics to expand the notion of exchange to 
non-market settings, and Blau (1964) added to this micro-theorization by stressing the 
interaction between the transactions and the eventual social structure, which, in turn, 
constrains the transactions. With both authors, individuals attain their personal or group 
goals by engaging in direct exchange of resources with others. 
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Generalized exchange, in contrast, occurs when a beneficiary is not obliged to 
reciprocate directly to her benefactor, but to an unspecified other actor: “an individual feels 
obliged to reciprocate another’s action, not by directly rewarding his benefactor, but by 
benefiting another actor implicated in a social exchange situation with his benefactor and 
himself” (Ekeh 1974:48). Generalized exchange
14 is quite different from direct exchange: it 
neither requires immediate reciprocity nor creates a direct obligation to a specific benefactor. 
Several subcategories of generalized exchange have been identified (Ekeh 1974; Lévi-Strauss 
1963; Sahlins 1965), and we focus here on network generalized exchange, where each actor is 
expected to give to another identifiable individual, as when helping an old lady cross the 
road. Such structure has been documented in the classical work on the Kula ring
15 
(Malinowski 1920), and in more recent block model analysis (Bearman 1997). Yamagishi & 
Cook (1993) find that the network generalized exchange system promote higher levels of 
cooperation than do other exchange systems, regardless of the size of the network or the 
group.  
While generalized exchange often takes place in communities, where the actors 
eligible to participate are known and boundaries are drawn, it can also guide transactions 
among strangers (Befu 1977; 1980; Emerson 1981; Molm and Cook 1995). Helping a 
stranded driver on a remote mountain road, for example, is such an instance for the 
benefactor does not expect the beneficiary to return the favor in the future.  
It is important to note that the term generalized exchange describes a mode of 
exchange, but is neutral as to the underlying motivation behind to the transaction.  Scholars 
have attributed the emergence of generalized exchange to altruism (Sahlins 1972; Takagi 
1996), social norms (Ekeh 1974; Lévi-Strauss 1969 [1949]), individual notions of fairness 
(Takahashi 2000), or rational choice and instrumental incentives (Granovetter 2002; Olson 
1965). 
In the phenomena described here, the mode of generalized exchange provides 
benefits that are comparable to embeddedness (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1997) and absent 
from markets, and especially beneficial in an knowledge-intensive setting, as the 
technological environment tends to be. First, if knowledge is amassed through experience 
and tenure, then those who were knowledge-rich will tend to be rich in other resources, such 
as power and prestige. It was difficult for an organizational neophyte to return a favor to a 
                                                 
14 The sociological literature uses “generalized exchange” (Takahashi 2000) side by side with “generalized 
reciprocity”  (Mauss 1954). After a close reading, it seems that the two terms refer to the same phenomenon. 
For simplicity, we will use “generalized exchange” throughout this paper. 
 
15 When the identity of participants and the order of contribution are predetermined, such as in the Kula Ring, 
it is a case of chain-generalized exchange, a subset of network generalized exchange. 
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seasoned member, simply because neophytes command few valuable resources. Second, 
even if a member had the resources to pay back a favor, the fluid structure of the collective 
makes it difficult to enforce direct reciprocity, even through subordination or deference (cf. 
Blau 1964). In an open source project for instance, if the benefactor and the beneficiary 
work in a team, they both knew that it would be disbanded at the end of the project and they 
may never work together again. To be sustainable, a system of direct favors requires 
sufficient trust in future reciprocation from the recipient, but in this fluid environment, such 
favors had to be returned quickly, as one never knew whether he would meet the beneficiary 
again. The porous boundaries of these collective, the ability to leave at will or to assume new 
on-line identity, all make future interaction even less certain. Hence, 
 
Proposition 3: Collective open innovation is more efficient when based on 
generalized exchange rather than direct exchange.  
 
Finally, collective institutional arrangements are necessary to coordinate and direct 
work, and take special importance in this informal setting. All of the collectives discussed 
have collectively-agreed organizational structures and routines. It may be a legal entity, as in 
the case of some open source software group, which created a non-profit to protect their 
work from abuse by commercial actors (O'mahony 2002). It can also be a designated virtual 
meeting point or web space, as the case is here, or a physical meeting time and place, as with 
the sport hobbyists describe by Franke & Shah (2003). In any case, the collective has a 
designated forum to meet and produce. In addition, there is a centralized collection of 
knowledge and a procedural handbook. In the case examined here, the FAQ (Anonymous 
2000) serves as a cache of accumulated organizational knowledge, structured in a question 
and answer format. In addition, it also includes detailed procedural guidelines, collectively 
written, that streamline contributions in a difficult setting of flat hierarchy and open 
boundaries. While attaching the FAQ to this article would have been cumbersome, the 
reader is encouraged to examine it to witness the meticulous details and attention given to it. 
Similar patterns have been described elsewhere (Lakhani and Hippel 2000). In the case of 
sport hobbyists it may be a newsletter or a scrapbook that fulfills a similar function. Hence, 
 
Proposition 4: Collective open innovation is more efficient when coordinated through 
informal institutions.  
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The collective may take different forms, from highly structured to loosely defined. 
O'Mahony (2002) describes how developers of open source software organize into legally 
recognized forms, such as a 401c non profit organization, in order to assure the continued 
free access and non-commercial distribution of their work, and to protect it from hijacking 
by a commercial actor. In the case described here, the collective is defined much looser: 
participants never meet in person, don’t use real names or even real e-mail address, and have 
little conversation that is outside the stated purpose of their collective – the sharing of 
copyrighted digital music goods. With such a low degree of interpersonal involvement, the 
collective is closer to an informal organization than to a community, in the sociological sense 
of the word (Wellman 1979; Wellman and Wortley 1990). Perhaps they should be better 
understood as informal organizations, based a logic that is different from that of firms and 
other formal organizations, but nonetheless capable of creating significant economic impact, 
for better or worse. 
Conclusions 
Collective open innovation is a curious phenomenon, one that defies conventional 
wisdom about the need for monetary rewards and copyrights for individual work, and the 
adverse effects of defection for common work. We embark here on an ambitious mission: 
we aim to explain a phenomenon on two separate levels: the individual motivation, and the 
collective coordination. For individuals, we identified the characteristics of the goods and the 
participants that make cooperation sustainable, even under constant free riding. For the 
collective coordination, we pointed out the relatively higher efficiency of generalized 
exchange in facilitating open collective innovation, and mentioned the need for informal 
institutions. 
The suggested framework has several advantages over previous theoretical attempts, 
we believe.  Some explanations for open source include learning (Lakhani and Hippel 2000) 
and reputational benefits (Lerner and Tirole 2002). These may seem plausible, but they 
clearly do not fit the phenomenon described here. The framework presented here fits and 
explains more instances of collective open innovation. It applies not only to the case of 
open-source software, which has been the major taker of theory, but also to file-sharing and 
other forms of on-line coordinated action. While other theoretical attempts have been 
closely tied to the phenomenon, this framework is wide enough to accommodate 
phenomena that manifests itself in different ways, yet relies on similar principles.  
Another advantage is that the framework can be used to derive refutable hypothesis, 
and thus passes the philosophy of science requirement for predictive power (Popper 1963) 
and the existence of a critical test, a designated method of refutation. The terms we use here 
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are clearly defined: non-rival goods, identifiability of beneficiaries, generalized exchange, and 
institutions are defined clearly, and their presence or absence can be identified with little 
ambiguity. On the other hand, concepts such as learning or reputation are difficult to 
observe independently, and one resorts to self-report by participants or proxies rather than a 
direct measure. 
The framework presented here is a step towards a theory, but not quite one yet. We 
see at least two challenges. First, we need to determine the theoretical boundaries of the 
explanation. Does the frame apply only to on-line innovation? If so, why? If not, what is the 
evidence that it holds in the off-line environment? It may as well apply to cases of off-line 
collective invention (Allen 1983) and “communities of practice” (Wenger 1998), as well as to 
similar phenomenon that take place within (or between) firms, but we need more empirical 
work to determine the possible match.  
Second, we still do not have enough evidence to theorize on the success of specific 
projects involving collective open innovation. We know, for instance, that some open source 
projects have failed, while others have succeeded enormously (Lakhani, Wolf, Bates and 
Dibona 2002), but we do not know what predicts success. It is likely that some of the factors 
noted here play a role, as well as traditional organizational factors such as recruiting, 
leadership, and governance. Perhaps there are also some other factors that matter specifically 
for cases of collective open innovation. We hope that future research will meet those 
challenges. 
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